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Abstract 
The objective of this research is to measure individuals’ fairness expectations and 
relate them to their market behavior in a private-negotiation institution. By doing this, 
we may inform model parameterization of field data and increase understanding of 
payment incidence causation. We hypothesize agents will change both their market and 
UG behavior when the tenant/proposer receives a subsidy following a successful 
negotiation. We also hypothesize that agents’ market behavior does relate to their 
fairness expectations in the UG. Two economic experiments were developed to test our 
hypotheses, a market and an ultimatum bargaining game experiment. We recruited 106 
undergraduate students and conducted the experiments in an experimental laboratory 
using a computer based market mechanism. Our findings suggest fairness expectations 
need to be considered as a possible constraint on agents’ profit maximization behavior 
in land markets. The experimental evidence indicates market sellers or landlords 
demand higher land rental prices when tenants receive per-unit subsidies. Their ability 
to obtain a higher price appears to be more formidable in markets with limited matching 
opportunities. We conclude fairness expectations may constrain individuals’ profit-
maximization behavior in the land market and, in turn, affect payment incidence in this 
market. 
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In the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, members of the World Trade 
Organization sought agriculture policies that would not distort world agriculture 
commodity markets. Subsequently, they developed three categories of policies—amber, 
blue, and green box. The most trade distorting policies are in the amber box while those 
which are least trade distorting are in the green box. Policies which are decoupled–or 
the transfer of payments to farmers is not reliant on agricultural production levels—are 
considered green box policies. In response, the US developed various decoupled 
payments, including production flexibility contracts, counter-cyclical payments, and 
loan deficiency payments.  These policies are generally referred to as Agricultural 
Market Transaction Act or AMTA payments (Barry K. Goodwin and Ashok K. Mishra, 
2006). However, research reported to date does not support their classification as green 
box policies (see Arathi Bhaskar and John C. Behin, 2009 for a review). Analysts find 
that consequently these policies affect farmers’ capital constraints, land value and use, 
and labor allocation. In fact, findings from payment incidence studies suggest land 
values or rental rates increase with AMTA payment eligibility (Terry Roe et al., 2003). 
The goal of this research is to identify dynamics underlying the land rental market that 
lead to payment incidence. We focus on individuals’ fairness expectations. 4 
 
Land value is easily captured according to its rental price. This price is typically 
established through private negotiation between landlords and tenants. The negotiation 
process is similar to an ultimatum bargaining game (UG)—the tenant (proposer) may 
make an offer to rent land and the landlord (respondent) may accept or reject the offer. 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) suggest firm profit maximization is subject to a 
fairness constraint in addition to traditional resource constraints.  Thus, both the 
tenant’s offer and the landlord’s response will depend on social fairness expectations as 
well as their own profit maximization objective. For example, landlords may require a 
higher rent from a tenant receiving AMTA payments on their land depending on their 
fairness expectations. Similar to consumers in the market place, they expect the rent of 
their land to fluctuate with the firm’s or tenant’s cost of production or profit margin. We 
use a combination of market and UG experiments to determine the possible constraints 
fairness may place on agents’ profit maximization. 
Experimental tests of UG behavior suggest the institutional negotiation 
environment does affect people’s fairness expectations, and thus, the final endowment 
allocation. For example, Fischbacker, Fong, and Fehr (2009) find the number of 
respondents and proposers in an UG game affects the endowment allocation due to 
increased competitiveness among recipients or proposers. In the case of rental contract 
negotiations, the number of tenants and landlords in an area may affect the rental rate. 
Also, if acreage is tied to an AMTA payment, it may increase the opportunity cost of a 
lost contract for the tenant.  
  While Roe, Somwarue and Diao find payment incidence occurs in land markets, 
they also discuss the difficulty of estimating the true pass-through rate of AMTA-like 5 
 
payments. Several variables create noise in the estimates, including capital constraints, 
tax policies, and incomplete markets. Economic laboratory experiments offer the 
opportunity to control for these confounding variables and measure the subsidy pass-
through rates in a land market institution. The laboratory can also be adapted to 
measure individuals’ fairness expectations with and without subsidy-like incentives. The 
objective of this research is to measure individuals’ fairness expectations and relate 
them to their market behavior in a private-negotiation institution. By doing this, we may 
inform model parameterization of field data and increase understanding of payment 
incidence causation. We hypothesize agents will change both their market and UG 
behavior when the tenant/proposer receives a subsidy following a successful 
negotiation. We also hypothesize that agents’ market behavior does relate to their 
fairness expectations in the UG. We now describe the methods and data collection 
procedures used to test these hypotheses. These descriptions are followed by our results 
and conclusions. 
Methods 
Two economic experiments were developed to test our hypotheses, a market and 
an ultimatum bargaining game experiment. We recruited undergraduate students, 
mainly from economics and business classes. The sessions occurred in an experimental 
economics laboratory using a computer network and typically took one and a half hours. 
The subjects were paid a $7 show up fee in addition to their earnings in both 
experiments. Earnings were denoted in a monetarily-convertible currency referred to 
ask tokens (1 token equaled 1 cent). Average earnings from the market experiment, paid 
to participants in addition to their $7 show-up fee, were $32.45 for sessions. The total 6 
 
average earnings from the UG game experiment, including the $1 subsidy payment, 
were $1.60. 
Private Negotiation Market Experiment 
The market experiment used private negotiation trading. Private negotiation is 
the relevant trading institution in many land rental markets. In private negotiation two 
agents, a buyer and a seller, make offers and counteroffers until there is agreement on 
price and other contractual arrangements. The market is comprised of two parts: a 
method of trading and a method of delivery. Two methods may be used in delivery of 
goods traded: advance production or forward delivery. In advance production sellers 
enter a market with inventory in stock, incurring sunk costs before sales. In a forward 
market transaction, price and quantity are agreed upon before production. In the land 
market, sunk costs associated with advance production (and their resulting risks and 
incentives) are not relevant. Land is not “produced” per se before it is rented, nor does it 
lose value if it is not rented. The risk associated with advance production is not 
significant. As a result, the experimental market developed for this research uses 
forward delivery. 
There were three market experiment treatments, summarized in Table 1. In the 
first treatment, Treatment 1, the buyer received a per-unit subsidy or 20 tokens for each 
unit traded. This payment is equivalent to a coupled price support. There was also 
random matching of buyers and sellers. This matching procedure controlled for the 
likelihood of reputation effects on the market price. In Treatment 2 the buyer did not 
receive a subsidy, but was allowed to find a seller through a mutual selection process. 
Thus, reputation effects were allowed to influence market price. This base treatment 
with no subsidy paid out allows for comparison of market impacts under alternative 7 
 
subsidy policies. In the final treatment of the market experiment, Treatment 3, the 
buyer received the per-unit 20 token subsidy and also chose their seller. All participants 
are informed of policy treatments via instructions prior to trading. 
In each round of Treatment 1 trading, four buyers and four sellers were randomly 
paired to negotiate prices and trade up to eight units over three bargaining rounds. 
Random pairing controlled for the confounding effects of reputation on trading 
outcomes. Before trading began, every buyer received a private table of unit redemption 
values for eight units while each seller received a corresponding table with unit costs for 
eight units. Redemption values began at 130 tokens for unit one and increased by 10 to 
60 tokens for the eighth unit. Costs began at 30 tokens and increased by 10 to 100 
tokens. Buyers earned the difference between the redemption value for the unit traded 
and the negotiated price across rounds. Likewise, sellers earned the agreed price minus 
their unit cost. Each participant received a trading period report, stating their private 
earnings for each period. Treatments 2 and 3 were conducted like Treatment 1, but the 
buyers were allowed to choose their trading partner. 
Each session consisted of at least 20 trading periods. The final number of trading 
periods was not revealed to the subjects to avoid strategic behavior. The market price 
was expected to converge to 80 tokens. These expectations were based on step functions 
of individual and aggregate unit cost and redemption value schedules following Davis 
and Holt (1993, pp. 9-14). We provide a graphical representation of the expected 
outcomes in Figure 1. 
Ultimatum Bargaining Game Experiment 8 
 
We conducted an additional UG experiment to measure participants’ fairness 
expectations. This experiment was conducted both in sessions with a market and 
without a market experiment to test the effect of market participation on fairness 
expectations. When a market experiment preceded the UG experiment, participants 
retained their market roles when they were paired to play in the UG experiment. The 
four participants acting as buyers in the market experiment were then assigned to be 
proposers. The four market sellers acted as responders in the UG experiment. The UG 
experiment followed methodology developed by Guth et al. (1982). However, the 
Proposer and Responder decision processes were simultaneous and the extensive form 
of the game collapsed into one step. In the first treatment, the Proposer decided how 
much of their $5 endowment to allocate to the respondent.  The Proposer had 11 discrete 
choice options. The Proposers worksheet is presented in Appendix I. The options are 
divided into 10 percent increments from zero to 100 percent of the endowment. At the 
same time as the Proposers made their allocation decision, the Responders had a similar 
worksheet to complete (see Appendix I). Responders decided the minimum amount of 
the endowment they were willing to accept from the Proposer. Once all of the 
worksheets were marked, the experimenter collected them. In the second treatment of 
the UG experiment, the Proposer was offered a one dollar bonus if there was a 
successful match ( i.e., the Respondent’s demand was less than or equal to their offer).  
The earnings from the ultimatum bargaining game experiment were determined 
by the experimenter at the end of the experiment session. The experimenter did this by 
matching Proposers and Respondents’ answers according to randomly predetermined 
matching arrangements. If the Proposer suggested a payment above the Respondent’s 9 
 
minimum payment requirement, then the allocation was divided as the Proposer 
suggested. The Proposer also received his one dollar bonus with the second treatment 
earnings following a successful negotiation. If the Proposer did not make an offer 
acceptable to the Respondent, then neither party receives payment. The Proposer did 
not receive a bonus in the second treatment either.  
The order of the first and second treatments of the UG game was randomly 
determined in each session. The UG game followed the market experiment in all 
sessions with a market experiment. 
 
Results 
Data were collected from 106 student subjects from September 2008 to January 
2009. Seventy two subjects participated in both the ultimatum bargaining game (UG) 
and a market experiments. A second control group, consisting of 34 subjects, only 
participated in the UG experiment. 
The Market Experiment Results 
  The market prices per market experiment treatment are presented in Figure 2. 
The market price is expected to converge to $80 in each treatment. In Treatment 1, 
however, the converged average price per round is much higher, $85.00. The price is 
lower than predicted in both Treatment 2 and 3. It is $76.90 in Treatment 2 and $77.80 
in Treatment 3. While the per-unit subsidy brings up the market price across 
treatments, only the Treatment 1 price is significantly different from the Treatment 2 
price (α<0.05). The Treatment 1 price is also significantly different from the Treatment 10 
 
3 price. Thus, it appears subsidization, especially with random matching, results in price 
elevation in the market institution.  
 
The Ultimatum Bargaining Game Results 
 
  The ultimatum bargaining game data are summarized in Table 2. The overall 
mean Proposer offer was 49 percent of the endowment (σ=13 percent).  Responders 
(Sellers in the market experiment) demanded 53 percent of the endowment on average 
(σ=19 percent). The mean offers and demands are reported, by treatment in Table 2. 
Using t-test statistics of the mean endowment offer or demand, there were no significant 
differences between the mean proposers’ offer and the respondents’ demand in either 
treatment. Further, although the mean respondent demand increases substantially from 
the Control to Subsidy treatment, the increase is not significant (i.e.,  ).  
We conducted additional Chi-Square tests for distributional differences in 
Proposers’ offers and Respondents’ demands across the subsidy and no-subsidy 
treatments. Graphs of the cumulative distribution functions are displayed in Figures 3 
and 4. There was not a significant difference in Proposers’ offers from the subsidy to the 
no-subsidy treatments ( ). There was, however, a significant difference in the 
frequency of Respondents’ demands when a subsidy was offered (χ2=24.49,  =0.00).  
The cumulative distribution function moves to the right or Respondents demand more 
of the endowment when the subsidy was offered. Consistent with the market findings, 
the subsidy affected agent behavior. 
 
 Market and UG Behavior Analysis 
  We estimated two logit models of agents’ average market bid behavior as a 
function of their UG bargaining behavior. If an agent’s average bids were above the 11 
 
market average then the dependent variable is one. If the average bid was at or below 
the market average bid then the dependent variable is zero. These models only include 
data from those people who participated in the market (i.e., 72 Proposers and 72 
Respondents).  The first model was estimated for respondents or sellers. The second was 
for proposers or buyers. The explanatory variables included the percentage of the 
endowment they demanded (by Respondents) or proposed (by Proposers) in the UG 
game, the presence of a market subsidy in the market experiment, their gender 
identification (female equals one and male equals zero), and a dummy variable entitled 
Choice. Choice was equal to one if the buyer and seller were allowed to find each other in 
the market and zero if they were randomly matched by the experimenter.   
  The results of the first, Proposer/Buyer/Tenant Model indicate there is a 
significant relationship between the proposer’s endowment offer and their average 
market bids (see Table 3). Proposers who made higher offers in the UG game were 56 
percent less likely to have higher than average market bids, when controlling for the 
presence of a market per-unit subsidy. The presence of a per-unit subsidy increased the 
buyer/tenants tendency to submit high average bids by 22 percent. These results 
indicate UG Proposers who were willing to give more to the respondent tended to have 
lower than average market bids when they were Buyers/Tenants in the marketplace.  
  On the other hand, UG Respondents’ endowment demand behavior was 
positively related to their average market bidding behavior in the 
Respondent/Seller/Landlord Model. As a Respondent increased his or her endowment 
demand by 10 percent, they were also 33 percent more likely to have higher than 
average market bidding behavior.  12 
 
  We also designed a multinomial logit model to predict the likelihood a participant 
had a low, 50-50 split, or high UG demand or offer. We estimated this model for all UG 
experiment participants, including both Respondents and Proposers regardless of their 
market experience. The dependent variable was zero when the Respondent or Proposer 
has an offer or demand below 50 percent of the endowment, one when the offer or 
demand was 50 percent of the endowment, and two when the offer or demand was 
above 50 percent of the endowment. The explanatory variables included a UG treatment 
dummy variable (equal to one in the subsidy treatment and zero otherwise), role 
dummy variable (equal to one for Proposer and zero for Respondents), gender dummy 
variable (equal to one for women and zero for men), and market participant dummy 
variable (equal to one for market participants and zero for non-market participants). 
The model results are displayed in Table 4.  
  Market participants were approximately nine percent less likely to submit a low 
UG offer or demand than non-market participants. The likelihood of a proposal to 
divide the endowment in half decreased when a matching reward was offered to the 
Proposer. However, Proposers were approximately 25 percent more likely to propose a 
50-50 division of the endowment than respondents. Respondents were 24 percent more 
likely to submit a high demand than Proposers were to submit a high offer. Market 
participation increased the likelihood of an equal division offer or demand by 11 percent. 
Naturally, the probability of a higher offer or demand increased when the Proposer was 








  Our findings suggest fairness expectations need to be considered as a possible 
constraint on agents’ profit maximization behavior in land markets. The experimental 
evidence indicates market sellers or landlords demand higher land rental prices when 
tenants receive per-unit subsidies. Their ability to obtain a higher price appears to be 
more formidable in markets with limited matching opportunities. The increased market 
price in our private-negotiation framework may translate to higher rental rates in the 
field and subsequently higher land prices. Previous findings identify payment incidence 
as a consequence of current AMTA payment policy design and suggest incidence result 
from capital constraints, tax policies, and incomplete markets (Terry Roe, Agapi 
Somwaru and Xinshen Diao, 2003). We acknowledge these may be important, but so 
are basic human fairness expectations.  
  Further research is needed to develop farm policy which is truly decoupled, not 
affecting capital market values or crop production. Further experimental economic 
research may be used to design and/or test-bed policies that consider the fairness 
constraints firms and individuals face. Other, experimental research suggests reducing 
matching risk will be an important consideration (Dale J. Menkhaus et al., 2007). 
Buyers in all markets are conscious of firms’ profit margins. When they perceive the 
firm or another individual has an unfair advantage, they will demand a larger portion of 
the pie (Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler, 1986). In the case of the 
land-rental markets, subsidy payments based on historical output are likely to drive up 
the value of land-related to specific types of output and, thus, affect crop production 14 
 
decisions. This, then directly violates the fundamental green-box policy objectives and 
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Appendix I: Experiment Instructions 
 
Control Experiment 2 Bid Sheet - C 
 
 
Proposer’s Participant Number:_________ 
 
Proposer: I choose the following option:  
     
 
Choice                
1  I will give  $0.00   to the Responder and keep   $5.00   . 
2  I will give  $0.50   to the Responder and keep   $4.50   . 
3  I will give  $1.00   to the Responder and keep   $4.00   . 
4  I will give  $1.50   to the Responder and keep   $3.50   . 
5  I will give  $2.00   to the Responder and keep   $3.00   . 
6  I will give  $2.50   to the Responder and keep   $2.50   . 
7  I will give  $3.00   to the Responder and keep   $2.00   . 
8  I will give  $3.50   to the Responder and keep   $1.50   . 
9  I will give  $4.00   to the Responder and keep   $1.00   . 
10  I will give  $4.50   to the Responder and keep   $0.50   . 
11  I will give  $5.00   to the Responder and keep   $0.00   . 
 
 
Note:  Circle the allotment you propose to give the responder.  If the Responder rejects 
it, then neither one of you will receive any money for Experiment 2.16 
 
Control Experiment 2 Bid Sheet - C 
 
 
Responder’s Participant Number:________ 
 
Responder: I am willing to accept the following choice (Please circle the choice you 
find acceptable):  
     
 
Choice                
1  I will accept   $0.00   and the Proposer will keep  $5.00   . 
2  I will accept    $0.50   and the Proposer will keep  $4.50   . 
3  I will accept    $1.00   and the Proposer will keep  $4.00   . 
4  I will accept    $1.50   and the Proposer will keep  $3.50   . 
5  I will accept    $2.00   and the Proposer will keep  $3.00   . 
6  I will accept    $2.50   and the Proposer will keep  $2.50   . 
7  I will accept    $3.00   and the Proposer will keep  $2.00   . 
8  I will accept    $3.50   and the Proposer will keep  $1.50   . 
9  I will accept    $4.00   and the Proposer will keep  $1.00   . 
10  I will accept    $4.50   and the Proposer will keep  $0.50   . 




Note:  Please circle the choice that corresponds with the minimum amount of money 
you are willing to accept from the Proposer.  If the Proposer proposes an amount that 
you do not accept, then neither one of you will receive any money for Experiment 2. 
 17 
 
Test Experiment 2 Bid Sheet - T 
 
 
Proposer’s Participant Number:_________ 
 
Proposer: I choose the following option (Please circle one choice):  
     
 
Choice                
1  I will give  $0.00   to the Responder and keep   $5.00   . 
2  I will give  $0.50   to the Responder and keep   $4.50   . 
3  I will give  $1.00   to the Responder and keep   $4.00   . 
4  I will give  $1.50   to the Responder and keep   $3.50   . 
5  I will give  $2.00   to the Responder and keep   $3.00   . 
6  I will give  $2.50   to the Responder and keep   $2.50   . 
7  I will give  $3.00   to the Responder and keep   $2.00   . 
8  I will give  $3.50   to the Responder and keep   $1.50   . 
9  I will give  $4.00   to the Responder and keep   $1.00   . 
10  I will give  $4.50   to the Responder and keep   $0.50   . 
11  I will give  $5.00   to the Responder and keep   $0.00   . 
 
 
Note:  Circle the allotment you propose to give the responder.  If the Responder rejects 
it, then neither one of you will receive any money for Experiment 2. 
If the Responder agrees with your choice, you will receive the allotment in the choice 
plus $1.00.18 
 
Test Experiment 2 Bid Sheet - T 
 
 
Responder’s Participant Number:________ 
 
Responder: I am willing to accept the following choice (Please circle the choice you 
find acceptable):  
     
 
Choice                
1  I will accept   $0.00   and the Proposer will keep  $5.00   . 
2  I will accept    $0.50   and the Proposer will keep  $4.50   . 
3  I will accept    $1.00   and the Proposer will keep  $4.00   . 
4  I will accept    $1.50   and the Proposer will keep  $3.50   . 
5  I will accept    $2.00   and the Proposer will keep  $3.00   . 
6  I will accept    $2.50   and the Proposer will keep  $2.50   . 
7  I will accept    $3.00   and the Proposer will keep  $2.00   . 
8  I will accept    $3.50   and the Proposer will keep  $1.50   . 
9  I will accept    $4.00   and the Proposer will keep  $1.00   . 
10  I will accept    $4.50   and the Proposer will keep  $0.50   . 




Note:  Please circle the choice that corresponds with the minimum amount of money 
you are willing to accept from the Proposer.  If the Proposer proposes an amount that 
you do not accept, then neither one of you will receive any money for Experiment 2. 
 
If you agree with the Proposer’s choice you will receive the allotment and the Proposer 
will receive the allotment plus $1.00. 
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Table 1. Summary of treatment combinations 
Treatment  Subsidy  Matching Risk 
Treatment 1  Per-unit Subsidy  Random Pairs 
Treatment 2  No Subsidy  Buyer Choose 
Treatment 3  Per-unit Subsidy  Buyer Choose 
 
 
Table 2. Proposer offer and respondent demand summary statistics for the control and 
subsidy treatments 
Treatment  Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
    Percent of Endowment 
Control  Proposer Offer  48  13 
 
Respondent 
Demand  51  19 
Subsidy  Proposer Offer  50  14 
   Respondent 





Table 3. Marginal effects from logit analysis of agents’ average market bids 
Independent Variable  Proposer/Buyer/Tenant Model  Respondent/Seller/Landlord Model 
 
Marginal Effect  Marginal Effect 
 
(Standard Error)  (Standard Error) 
Endowment Percentage  -0.56*  0.33* 
  (0.31)  (0.13) 
Subsidy  0.22*  0.1 
  (0.12)  (0.08) 
Gender  0.17  0.09 
  (0.14)  (0.07) 
Choice  -0.23  -0.07 
   (0.12)  (0.07) 
Log-Likelihood Ratio  10.4***  7.28*** 







Table 4. Marginal effects of multinomial logit analysis of participants’ UG behavior 
Variable  All ParticipantsA 
  Probability of Low Offer/Demand 
UG Subsidy Treatment  -0.0284 
  (0.0560) 
Role  -0.0186 
  (0.0580) 
Gender  0.0314 
  (0.0651) 
Market Participant  -0.0852* 
  (0.0494) 
   Probability of 50-50 Offer/Demand 
UG Subsidy Treatment  -0.2246*** 
  (0.0670) 
Role  0.2552*** 
  (0.0680) 
Gender  -0.0271 
  (0.0753) 
Market Participant  0.1076*** 
  (0.0605) 
   Probability of High Offer/Demand 
UG Subsidy Treatment  0.2530*** 
  (0.0632) 
Role  -0.2366*** 
  (0.0647) 
Gender  -0.0043 
  (0.0732) 
Market Participant  -0.0223 
  (0.0570) 
Log-Likelihood Ratio  28.7498*** 
* > 90% significant, **>95% significant, *** > 99% significant 
AThe marginal effect standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Ultimatum Bargaining Game Offer Choice

































Ultimatum Bargaining Game Demand Choice
Subsidy Treatment No Subsidy Treatment